Effectiveness of brokering within account management organizations by Dekker, D.J. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The version of the following full text has not yet been defined or was untraceable and may
differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/19489
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES ON 
RESEARCH IN RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of Brokering within Account Management 
Organizations 
 
David Dekker, Frans Stokman, and Philip Hans Franses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES ON RESEARCH IN RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 
Reference number RRM-2004-04-MKT 
Publication status / version February 2004 
Email address contact author d.dekker@nsm.kun.nl 
URL (electronic version) http://www.nsm.kun.nl 
Address Nijmegen School of Management 
University of Nijmegen 
Thomas van Aquinostraat 1 
P.O. Box 9108 
6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
Phone: +31 (0)24 361 54 62 
Fax: +31 (0)24 361 30 79 
Email: d.dekker@nsm.kun.nl 
Internet: www.nsm.kun.nl 
  
Effectiveness of Brokering within Account Management 
Organizations 
 
David Dekker 
University of Nijmegen 
 
Frans Stokman 
University of Groningen 
 
Philip Hans Franses 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
 
 1
Effectiveness of Brokering within Account Management Organizations 
 
We present a model that integrates the contradicting Burtian and Krackhardtian broker theories to explain 
effectiveness of brokering for individuals within account management organizations. Using data on a network of 
55 individuals in a financial account management organization, we test how brokerage of different resource 
relationships and Simmelian trust relationships affect individual effectiveness. We find that although brokering 
in ‘specification’ processes enhances effectiveness, it harms to broker in ‘delivery’ processes. Furthermore, 
brokers of Simmelian trust relationships appear to face more diverse role expectations, which causes role 
ambiguity that reduces effectiveness. These results have implications for account management organization. 
 
Introduction 
Brokers connect otherwise unconnected others in a network of relationships (Simmel, 1950). 
There are different conflicting predictions about brokers’ effectiveness (Burt, 1992; Podolny 
and Baron, 1997; Krackhardt, 1999). Interestingly, these contradictory predictions originate 
from two theories rooted in Simmel’s sociological theory (Krackhardt, 1999). The key to this 
paradox is that the theories describe distinct mechanisms. The first theory focuses on access to 
resources. Burt (1992) suggests that brokers have better access to resources and hence will be 
more effective in performing their tasks. The second theory emphasizes that brokers typically 
face diverse informal role expectations, which could lead to role stress (Krackhardt, 1999). 
Different meta-studies show that role stress could negatively affect individual effectiveness 
(e.g., Tubre and Collins, 2000). Hence, it is not straightforward to show whether brokers’ net 
contribution to organizational processes is positive or negative. In addition, the issue of 
brokers’ effectiveness is important for the understudied field of account management 
organization. Therefore we will confront these two theories as they apply to account 
management processes.  
 
Organizations introduce account management to focus on the specific needs of important 
customers (hereafter accounts). The importance of account management follows from the fact 
that organizational survival and growth of many firms greatly depends on accounts. Also, 
customers often desire account management. As they rationalize procurement, these 
customers restrict business to limited sets of suppliers and/or require additional services (e.g., 
Shipp, Roering, and Cardozo, 1988; Workman, Homburg, and Jensen, 2003). Selling 
organizations are under pressure to offer and to promptly deliver tailor-made solutions to the 
specific needs of accounts and hence they introduce account management.  
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To be effective in account management processes, individuals’ access to resources is crucial 
(Weitz and Bradford, 1999; Sengupta, Krapfel, and Pusateri, 2000; Workman, Homburg, and 
Jensen, 2003). For example, Sengupta et al. (2000) show the importance of “intrapreneurship” 
(see, Pinchot, 1985), which they interpret as the search and acquisition of resources (including 
human resources) within the organization. We argue that this behavior in account 
management relates in two important ways to informal networks. 
First, informal networks provide access to resources and hence facilitate or hinder 
intrapreneurial behavior (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Hansen, 1999). Secondly, the search 
and acquisition of resources in informal networks affect the nature of all jobs in account 
management. In fact, this behavior creates informal role expectations for intrapreneurs as well 
as for those who hold the resources intrapreneurs seek. We emphasize that for account 
management organizations to meet the needs of accounts, it is important that individuals 
within account management meet their informal role expectations. In short, networks of 
relationships transmit expectations (Nadel, 1957; Merton, 1968) and also allow or impede 
access to resources needed to realize these expectations (Burt, 2000). 
 
The main contribution of this paper is that it shows how access to specific resources, and 
diversity in informal role expectations, affect individual effectiveness within account 
management organizations. Here we define individual effectiveness as the degree to which 
individuals contribute to the realization of organizational objectives. Burt (1992) and 
Krackhardt (1999) give (partly) contradictory predictions of individual effectiveness, although 
they both base these predictions on Simmel (1950). Hereafter, we first describe what we will 
call the Burtian model and the Krackhardtian model and make underlying hypotheses of these 
models explicit. Furthermore, we integrate these two models in a more general Simmelian 
model specification. 
 
Broker Theories 
A broker and those he/she connects may belong to the same or to different organizations. 
Subsequently, we could discern different types of brokers (Fernandez and Gould, 1994). For 
example, brokers linking two different organizations, while not being member of either, are 
called liaison-brokers (Fernandez and Gould, 1994). Furthermore, many studies focus on 
brokers that represent an organization, (representatives or gate-keepers) (Adams, 1976; 
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Friedman and Podolny, 1992), and show the value to organizations of brokers like purchase 
managers (Spekman, 1979) or negotiators (Friedman and Podolny, 1992). Here we focus on 
brokers within one organization, which Fernandez and Gould (1994) would call coordinators.  
 
 
Burtian Broker Theory  
Organizations experience many advantages of brokers within their boundaries. For example, 
they contribute to faster spread of information,  wider spread of information, development of 
innovations, and a better ability to cope with change (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Burt, 
Hogarth, and Michaud, 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). These organizational advantages 
stem from individual advantages that enhance brokers’ effectiveness. Based on Simmel 
(1950), Burt (1992) identifies two types of individual advantages for brokers; information 
advantages and control advantages. Information advantage includes access to heterogeneous 
knowledge, timely reception of information, and a wider referral (Burt, 1992). Control 
advantages occur in three instances, that is, first, when a broker has a resource (including 
time) that two unconnected others want, second, when he/she wants something both have, and 
third, when one wants something from the other and can only obtain it through the broker 
(Simmel, 1950; Burt, 1992). Henceforth, we refer to these effects as the Burtian model. 
 
A recent refinement to the Burtian model is the insight that brokers’ advantages depend on 
relationship contents. Podolny & Baron (1997) suggest that brokers –more specifically, 
“structural holes” (see Burt, 1992)– are beneficial in networks that conduit resources, but 
disadvantageous in networks of affective ties. We go even further and suggest that whether 
brokers’ enjoy advantages depends on specific resource types. For example, Hansen (1999) 
shows that transfer of more tacit knowledge resources within organizations requires strong 
relationships. Because broker relationships are often weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 
1992), they may be less appropriate to transfer tacit knowledge resources. Therefore, since we 
want to apply the Burtian model to processes in account management, we first need to answer 
the question which fundamental account management processes can we associate with 
different types of resources? 
  
Account Management Task Typology. Account management encompasses coordination of 
marketing and sales efforts between different functional groups, geographic areas, divisions 
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and\or hierarchical levels within the organization (e.g., Shapiro and Moriarty, 1982; Cespedes, 
1994; Workman, Homburg, and Jensen, 2003). Different empirical typologies of account 
management organization have been identified in marketing literature (Shapiro and Moriarty, 
1980; 1984a; Dishman and Nitse, 1998; Homburg, Workman, and Jensen, 2000). For most 
forms of account management organization, matrix organization forms are applied to 
coordinate inputs from different organizational units (Shapiro and Moriarty, 1984b; 1984a). 
Matrix forms facilitate emergence of (temporal) inter-functional teams in which different 
specialists cooperate (Galbraith, 1973; Ford and Randolph, 1992). Furthermore, matrix forms 
offer the autonomy that intrapreneurial behavior requires. In account management these teams 
coordinate the integration of functional expertise and customer expertise to respond 
effectively and efficiently to customer needs. 
 
In the setting of account management, we may discern two primary tasks that require 
fundamentally different types of knowledge resources. First, as account management adds the 
aspect of the customization to traditional selling, the importance increases of understanding 
and specifying what individual accounts need (Workman, Homburg, and Jensen, 2003). 
Secondly, account management has to deliver the tailor-made offerings that result from the 
specification process. It seems that this distinction is fundamental in management literature. 
 
For example, the task-dichotomy in account management concurs with the distinction in 
general management between tasks guided by what and how questions (Simon, 1957). These 
questions are respectively associated with ‘know what’ and ‘know how’ knowledge, and 
hence indicate the differences in resources needed to perform these tasks. 
Also, the task distinction in account management is similar to the distinction made in services 
marketing between service specification and service delivery (Zeithaml, Berry, and 
Parasuraman, 1988). The SERVQUAL model, (Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman, 1988) 
emphasizes the importance for top management to identify customer expectations and match 
service offerings accordingly. In account management this task is decentralized at the level(s) 
that maintains account relations. The other task explicitly brought forward in Zeithaml et al.’s 
(1988) model is the delivery of services. After specification (and acceptance by a customer), a 
service has to get ‘produced’. 
The specification task is a more explorative task that involves the search for possibilities 
within an organization to meet accounts’ demands. It is the search for and the  recombination 
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of knowledge about products, services and processes, which are encompassed within an 
organization and allow to meet accounts’ needs (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Grant, 1996b). As 
individuals and teams process and reprocess such knowledge they come to a finite solution set 
that specifies a number of products and\or services.  
Specification in account management is a task very similar to innovation processes. Most 
often comparable to innovation processes that combine existing ideas, processes and 
products\services or architectural innovations that reorder the relations between existing 
product components (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Sometimes these processes are literal 
innovation processes. 
The primary type of knowledge transferred between individuals in specification processes  
could best be characterized as explicit ‘know what’ knowledge (Ryle, 1949; Polanyi, 1966). It 
requires transfer of explicit knowledge about which possibilities an organization has to offer 
that can serve customers. This differs from the ‘know how’ needed for delivery tasks.  
 
In delivery tasks account management makes things happen for accounts. Delivery tasks in 
account management focus on the integration of routine tasks that require ‘know how’ of 
products or services and the transfer of this knowledge (cf., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kogut 
and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996a). The routines and skills that make things happen often 
consist of tacit knowledge (Ryle, 1949; Polanyi, 1966; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). Also in account management, the ‘know how’ needed in delivery tasks 
has a major tacit component. Specialists in one field usually will not know in detail how to 
‘produce’ services or service components that belong to a different specialist field. Service 
delivery tasks often require transfer of ‘know how’, which typically has a larger tacit 
component. 
Let us emphasize that both tasks may need explicit and tacit knowledge. However, we argue 
that individuals involved in specification tasks will transfer more explicit knowledge, while 
knowledge transfers between individuals in delivery tasks will have a larger tacit component. 
We will refer to the different types of knowledge as ‘know what’ and ‘know how’, as this 
more general distinction most closely relates to the distinction between service specification 
and delivery. The transfers of different types of knowledge make salient the structural 
characteristics of the transfer relationships. 
 
Brokers in Resource Flows  
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Hargadon and Sutton (1997) provide a number of examples that show how brokers contribute 
to innovation processes by recombining ideas. Similar, in account management it is not just 
the amount of ‘know what’ knowledge that affects the quality of specification tasks; rather it 
is the diversity or heterogeneity of ‘know what’ knowledge. Brokers can contribute in two 
ways to this variation in knowledge. Brokers’ information advantages we earlier mentioned 
(access, speed, referral) allow them to accumulate more heterogeneous knowledge than non-
brokers. Furthermore, brokers’ control advantages allow them to influence the informational 
diversity within teams. They may strategically pass information to a team and may bring in 
new team members with different backgrounds. 
Therefore, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 1: Brokering in ‘know what’ networks increases the broker’s individual 
effectiveness.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Hansen (1999) shows that tacit-knowledge transfers require strong 
relationships. Granovetter (1973) was the first to recognize that broker relationships are often 
weak ties. Indeed, for service delivery tasks teamwork has been found to be especially 
important (Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman, 1988), which suggests close cooperation. Burt 
(2000) suggests that brokers within teams typically contribute less to team output than non-
brokers. Above we argue that ‘know how’ needed in service delivery tasks has a large tacit 
component. Hence, we assume that service delivery tasks thrive well when executed in 
networks of strong relations and less well in brokering relationships. Therefore, we 
hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 2: Brokering in ‘know how’ networks decreases the  broker’s individual 
effectiveness.   
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 deal with the effective access to resources needed for different processes 
in account management. They are derived from broker theory in the Burtian tradition that is 
explicating a direct relation between brokers’ structural position and individual effectiveness. 
Krackhardt (1999) suggests an indirect effect on individual performance through role stress. 
 
Krackhardtian Broker Theory 
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Brokers face diverse and inconsistent sets of role expectations that may cause role stress and 
thus harm individuals’ effectiveness. (Kahn, et al., 1964; Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Burt, 
1997; Krackhardt, 1999). The Krackhardtian model proposes two major points (Krackhardt, 
1999). First, relationships embedded in reciprocal triads (Simmelian relationships) more 
strongly transmit role expectations than isolated dyadic relationships. Second, individuals 
suffer more inconsistent role expectations when they broker two or more different triads 
instead of isolated individuals.  
Simmel (1950: 135-144)  argues that strongly connected triads (smallest possible cliques) 
differ from isolated dyads in three distinctive ways (see also, Krackhardt, 1999). Compared to 
individuals in isolated dyads, those in triads give up more of their individuality, bargaining 
power and face less harsh dyadic conflicts because a third perspective is present that weakens 
polarization and escalation of conflict. Krackhardt (1999) proposes that Simmelian ties reduce 
freedom and independence and increase constraints for individuals.  
 
The Krackhardtian model is consistent with social network theory, which states that within 
cliques, group norms form and are enforced (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 
1993). Cliques enable conditions to monitor  behavior, rapidly spread information, and shared 
opinion formation about norm deviant behavior, also called gossip (Merry, 1984). These 
conditions evoke norm-compliant behavior, reduce uncertainty and enhance interpersonal 
trust. Kahn, et al. (1964: 151) suggest that norms are a specific sub-set of role expectations 
that transcend specific roles. Also, Krackhardt (1999) suggests that group norms anchor rules 
for the specific behavior expected of each individual. Therefore, expectations formed in 
cliques are stronger expectations, because they are based on shared cognitions and emotions 
among clique members. Furthermore, the interrelation of expected behaviors of different 
individuals suggests that we can refer to them as role expectations. 
 
Krackhardt’s (1999) analysis contributes to role analysis in social network theory, because it 
makes explicit the “… correlation between content and structure” (Lorrain and White, 1971). 
According, to the Krackhardtian model, triads produce conditions in which role expectations 
arise. However, he makes not explicit what the contents are of role relationships, although he 
suggests that trust is strongly associated with Simmelian ties (Krackhardt, 1992; Krackhardt, 
1998). In this paper we complement the Krackhardtian model by arguing that a fundamental 
content of role relationships is trust in intentions.  
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 Trust as Content of Role Relationships. Role theory defines roles in terms of behavioral 
expectations in relation to others (Linton, 1936). Nadel (1957) emphasizes that roles both 
encompass “…execution of certain rights and obligations”, and, “…this set of rights and 
obligations embodied in a piece of knowledge—in a norm or prescription, or perhaps only in 
an image people carry in their heads” (Nadel, 1957: 29, italics as in original). Hence, role 
relationships transmit expectations about ideal type behavior that matches the expected 
behavior of others.  
A role is associated with a role set, which is “…that complement of social relationships in 
which persons are involved simply because they occupy a particular status“ (Merton, 1968: 
42). (A status is a formal role, such as account manager or a specific functional specialist). All 
members of an individual’s role set depend to some degree on his\her performance in some 
fashion (Kahn, et al., 1964: 14). Role set members send expectations to an individual, directly 
or indirectly, not merely to inform, but to influence a person’s behavior (Kahn, et al., 1964: 
15). Uncertainty about the performance of team members is always present, and certainly 
present in temporal teams (Simmel, 1978: 179; Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, 1996), which 
we also encounter in account management. Although a formal role provides a base for role 
expectations relevant to preconceived circumstances, we will argue that informal networks of 
interpersonal trust provide a basis for (normative) role expectations that govern behavior in 
the dynamic account management processes.  
 
Interpersonal trust is an attitude of one individual towards another based on perceptions, 
beliefs, and attributions (Whitener, et al., 1998). Trust is neither based on complete 
knowledge nor on complete ignorance (Simmel, 1950). Trust is a mix of knowledge and 
emotions (Lewis and Weigert, 1985), or affection and cognition (McAllister, 1995), that 
produces expectations about behavioral intentions and competences beyond what knowledge 
and experience can substantiate (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Mollering, 2001). Furthermore, 
detrimental effects may occur to trustor and trustee if these expectations about behavioral 
intentions and competences are incorrect (Barber, 1983; Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Important 
here is that we conceptualize trust as a socio-psychological process that produces 
expectations, and as we will argue, in some instances these are role expectations. 
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Several authors recognize (not always in the same terms) trust in intentions and trust in ability 
as two dimensions of trust that may produce normative behavioral expectations (Heider, 1958; 
Deutsch, 1960). The intention dimension relates to dutiful behavior (Barber, 1983) and loyalty 
(Dooley and Fryxell, 1999) or norm compliant behavior (Coleman, 1990). Trust in intentions 
produces expectations about the willingness to comply with behavioral norms. For example, 
when an individual tries to understand other team members with different functional 
backgrounds, he/she complies with the group norm to positively contribute to a joint output. 
The ability dimension relates to competent behavior (Barber, 1983; Dooley and Fryxell, 
1999). Trust in ability produces expectations that skills are sufficient such that specific 
outcomes can be attained.  
Although both dimensions of trust produce expectations, we argue that trust in abilities 
produces no role expectations. Trust in abilities produces expectations about whether an 
individual is able to perform a specific role, not whether that individual will enact consistent 
to this role. Furthermore, recall that account management requires cooperation between 
different specialists on innovative-like tasks. Usually specialists can not obtain from an 
informal network ‘cognitive familiarity’ (Simmel, 1978) about the required abilities for a task 
or whether others possess these abilities. In contrast, trust in intentions does produce role 
expectations given that the trust relationship has the structural characteristic of a role 
relationship, i.e. is a Simmelian tie. 
Simmelian triads provide knowledge about individuals’ intentions to comply with norms. The  
gossip that occurs in these triads creates cognitive maps of social identities and reputations of 
individuals (Merry 1984). This knowledge is essential for role expectations to arise. 
Individuals have cognitive maps that reflect their trust in others willingness to comply with 
normative behavioral expectations. These maps and emotions are particularly developed with 
regard to those behaviors of others on which the individual is dependent. Trust in intentions 
reflects the expectations about the role behavior relevant to the trustor. 
 
Role Ambiguity. As brokers bridge unconnected role set members, it becomes more likely 
that diversity and inconsistency of role expectations increases. Most susceptible to role stress 
are brokers of Simmelian ties, hereafter Simmelian brokers (see fig 1), because these 
relationships are strong transmitters of role expectations. One role stressor occurs when role 
expectations are incompatible. In these instances a person may experience a psychological 
conflict, also known as role conflict (Kahn, et al., 1964: 18-21).  
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*** Insert figure 1 about here*** 
Another role stressor becomes manifest when individuals experience a lack of information on 
how to perform the tasks they have to accomplish. In these cases individuals experience role 
ambiguity (Kahn, et al., 1964: 22-26). Although role expectations could be clear, when 
information on how to meet these expectations is missing or confusing (possibly because of 
conflicting expectations), uncertainty for individuals increases, and role ambiguity rises. 
Unpredictability of future events beyond an individuals’ control causes role ambiguity (Kahn, 
et al., 1964: 72). 
Most studies that explore brokers’ role stress (including Krackhardt, 1999) focus on role 
conflict. However, meta-studies show that role conflict not evidently has a positive or a 
negative effect on job outcomes, while role ambiguity unequivocally has a negative effect on 
performance (Jackson and Schuler, 1985; Sullivan and Bhagat, 1992; Tubre and Collins, 
2000). More specifically, marketing literature suggest that especially role ambiguity resulting 
from internal organizational sources, such as bosses or co-workers, negatively affect sales 
persons job outcomes (Rhoads, Singh, and Goodell, 1994). Therefore, in contrast to earlier 
work on the relation between role stress and brokers, we focus on role ambiguity. 
Three conditions are essential for the predictability of future outcomes and hence the absence 
of role ambiguity. These are, first, the ability to anticipate consequences of actions (desired 
and unwanted), second, the awareness of determinants of, and, likelihood of relevant events 
not self-produced, and third, the dependence on the stability of surrounding conditions (Kahn, 
et al., 1964: 72). We suggest that for Simmelian brokers all three conditions are less certain 
than for non-Simmelian brokers as their behavior is under scrutiny of norms that are upheld 
by different triads. These norms could be conflicting (Krackhardt, 1999). Also, because roles 
are not enacted all at once, but in a process over time (Nadel, 1957: 29-30), dealing with 
different sets of norms might cause uncertainty and confusion. In short, role-consistent 
behavior is complex for Simmelian brokers. 
Three examples will illustrate that Simmelian brokers are more likely to face the conditions 
under which role ambiguity arises. First, Simmelian brokers can easily be surprised by 
adversary actions of one triad because of actions in other triads. Past behavior consistent with 
norms in triad A at moment t, might become known to, and be disapproved of, by triad B at 
time t+1 (see also Wittek, 1999, on relational signaling). Second, Simmelian brokers are 
likely to have less in-depth knowledge about the norms in each triad, as they face more 
different sets of norms. Especially, when we consider that norms are dynamic, we may infer 
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that Simmelian brokers are less aware of determinants of relevant events (e.g. change in 
norms) and make less good judgment on the likelihood of occurrence. Third, the threat of 
social retaliation after norms have been breached, say judgmental gossip or exclusion from a 
triad, makes “surrounding conditions” less stable (see also, Lindenberg, 1998). For example, 
access to a crucial resource a Simmelian broker derives from one triad may suddenly diminish 
when he/she harms behavioral norms of that triad . Therefore, we hypothesize 
  
Hypothesis 3: For Simmelian brokers in networks of ‘trust in intentions’ role ambiguity 
increases. 
 
And, in line with earlier findings, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 4: Role ambiguity negatively affects job performance. 
 
Note that the Burtian model and Krackhardtian model are conflicting in their predictions of 
brokers’ effectiveness, although the causal processes they both describe are not conflicting. 
Actually, Burtian broker theory much ignores the indirect effects of trust brokerage, while 
Krackhardt (1999) neglects the issue of relationship contents. As both theories are based on 
Simmel (1950), we argue that a model that merges the Burtian and Krackhardtian models will 
better fit the data than either of the separate models. The merged model that theoretically 
would be most appropriate we call the Simmelian model. 
A second point to emphasize is that both models differ in the way they conceptualize 
brokering. From the difference between structural characteristics of relationships (Simmelian 
vs. raw ties) follows that the proposed measures differ. This fact allows us to test and compare 
the performance of the different models. 
In our empirical analysis we will control in each model for the effects of the competing 
model. We will operationalize the models according to the system presented in figure 2. In the 
Burtian model, we will use Burt’s measure for brokerage, while we develop a individual level 
measure of Simmelian brokerage consistent with Krackhardt (1999).  
*** Insert figure 2 about here*** 
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Method 
In this section we describe our data, we develop a Simmelian broker measure and discuss the 
other measures we use. Furthermore, we develop four systems of equations to test our 
hypotheses, and compare the Burtian, Krackhardtian and Simmelian model. We describe 
different statistical tests that we use to draw inferences.  
 
Setting. We collected our data in the setting of account management in a large bank in a 
Western-European metropolitan area. Especially, we focus on the segment of personal 
financial affairs of financial successful individuals and families, such as entrepreneurs, 
physicians, lawyers, and artists. In this setting, account management mostly deals with 
personal financial needs and its effects on business finance.  Examples are the management 
and construction of mortgage arrangements, pension plans and investment portfolios. In the 
account management organization, functional specialists and account managers cooperate to 
deal with these customers.  
The network includes 57 employees divided over 4 specialist departments and 1 department 
with account managers. This network boundary has been set after consultation with the local 
management team. We decided to include those specialist departments that directly contribute 
to service specification and service delivery tasks.  
The account managers operate in one out of six teams, where each account manager has 
assistance of one or two ‘internal account managers’, who support in advice and clerical 
duties. Each account team is responsible for a relative large number of customers (100 to 
150). Certain technical characteristics, such as complexities in tax regulations, sizable risk and 
the intertwining of personal and business finance, make it necessary for the account managers 
to bring in support from one or more specialists.  
Specialists also have to deal with the requests of account managers operating in other market 
segments, and some have to deal with external intermediaries or directly with customers. Such 
an organization implies that all individuals to some degree are involved in the two tasks under 
consideration. For us this offers an unique opportunity to include all the individuals in our 
analysis as they all contribute to the final outcome.  
 
Measurement. A questionnaire has been developed that measures role ambiguity, individual 
effectiveness, the resources and trust networks. Also, we measure some control variables, to 
secure against spurious effects. Our network selection approach allows us to sharply define 
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the network boundary (Marsden, 1990). We could identify all 57 individuals involved in 
specification and delivery tasks in account management during the six months prior to the 
moment of data collection and who were still employed by the organization. 
Individual effectiveness, trust, and, resource networks have been measured with questions in 
roster format. A question in roster format asks respondents to answer the question with regard 
to a given list of individuals.  A full response on these questions ensures the measurement of 
the entire predetermined network. This way of data collection makes it less biased as opposed 
to ego-centered data collection where we would ask individuals to list their own networks 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Furthermore, role ambiguity has been measured with the 
classical psychometric scale developed by Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970). 
The final response on the roster questions has been 96% (55 respondents). This response rate 
was achieved by telephonically contacting non-respondents after two weeks. We cautiously 
inquired if there were any specific reasons why they did not reply. The primary answer was 
that respondents lacked time. Some non-response was based on concerns about 
confidentiality. We could sufficiently neutralize most of these concerns by restating that 
nobody besides the researchers would see the results at an identifiable individual level. The 
main argument we used was that it would be extremely detrimental to the researchers’ 
reputation to violate this confidentiality. We were then able to ask for a commitment to 
respond after emphasizing the importance of a (near) 100% response rate for this type of 
research. The maximum number of these personal reminders was 5. Data collection 
effectively took 7 weeks. 
 
Endogenous Variables 
Individual effectiveness. Recall that we define individual effectiveness as the degree to which 
individuals contribute to the realization of organizational objectives. To measure individual 
effectiveness we asked respondents to give their opinion on the performance of those they had 
cooperated with in the last year. As areas of contributions vary over individuals we asked 
respondents: "Please consider those of the people listed below with whom you have 
cooperated to serve a customer in the last six months. How successful was this cooperation for 
the organization?"  In the heading for this question we explicitly describe organizational 
success as: "Organizational success relates to success for [company name] such as generating 
profits, customer retention or increasing customer satisfaction as a result of cooperation." 
Company informants confirmed that these were important objectives for the firm. 
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Respondents rated the level of success on a 5-point scale (1 = very negative, 2 = negative, 3 = 
no attribution to success, 4 = positive and 5 = very positive). 
We calculate the perceived contribution to organizational performance of individual i (OPi) as 
the inter-rater average. Note that OPi gives a score that does not depend on the self-perception 
of the focal individual and it depends only on those that could have formed role expectations 
about his/her effectiveness. 
To examine to what extent this single item\multiple rater measure unambiguously captures 
individual effectiveness we check its concurrent validity. For this purpose we use a database 
on the sales of four services for which the account managers in the sample were responsible. 
This database only contains information on about 1000 actual sales of the 6 account managers 
in the six months preceding the distribution of the questionnaire. We constructed performance 
measures that are comparable across the different services through mean normalization and 
averaging the sales figures into 24 (6 account managers × 4 services) comparable performance 
measures. 
Theoretically, we can relate each account manager’s sales in the 4 service categories to 
clusters of service specialists that cooperated with the account manager in establishing these 
sales. In practice we could identify 23 ‘account manager-service’ clusters of specialists, 
because one account manager had no sales in a specific service category and no relationships 
with specialists on that service category. Subsequently, we calculated the average perceived 
performance in each cluster. We compare these 23 perceived performance values of the 
account managers with the associated 23 performance indicators from the sales database.  
To check for concurrent validity we calculate the Kendall's tau-b correlation between the 
actual and perceived performance measures. This correlation is a rank order correlation that 
compares all possible pairs for both variables. This implies that n(n-1)/2 pairs are to be 
compared, where n is the number of performance measures (here, n=23). A concordant pair is 
a pair of observations, which has the same sign for the difference between both variables. For 
example, X1 –X2 and Y1 –Y2 are either positive or both negative. A discordant pair corresponds 
to opposite signs, when X1 –X2 is positive (negative) while Y1 –Y2 is negative (positive). The 
odds ratio between concordant and discordant pairs determines the value of the Kendall tau-b 
correlation coefficient. 
For our performance measures we obtain a Kendall tau-b correlation of .31, which 
corresponds with a one-sided p-value of .02. We use a one-sided test because we expect a 
positive relation. This result supports concurrent validity. To calculate the odds ratio, we 
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ignore pairs that have zero difference on one or both variables. The odds ratio between 
concordant and discordant pairs is about 2, which implies that 2 out of 3 pairs have the same 
sign. 
 
This result gave us confidence that our single item\multi-rater measure is a good indicator of 
individual effectiveness.  
 
Role Ambiguity. We measure role ambiguity by adapting the 5-point scale items from Rizzo, 
House and Lirtzman (1970) (see table 1). We use confirmatory factor analysis to assess the 
contribution of the items to the scale to derive a one-dimensional scale. Also, we examine the 
scale on internal consistency. 
*** Insert table 1 about here *** 
 
Initial confirmatory factor analysis of the role ambiguity scale reveals low contributions of 
item 1 and 4 (see table 1). However, the fit statistics and α-value indicate one dimensionality 
and sufficient reliability for this scale (χ2= 9.69, df=14, p=.78, RMSEA=.00, AGFI=.90; 
α=.72).  
 
Explanatory Variables. To measure the resources networks we asked “How often do you 
request ‘specification’ information?” and “How often do you request ‘delivery’ information?”. 
In the introduction to these questions we defined the terms ‘specification’ and ‘delivery’ in 
terms that are familiar to the industry.  The trust in intention and trust in ability networks we 
measured with the questions “Do you trust that they keep your interests in mind?” and “Do 
you trust in their competences and abilities?” respectively. Associated with these questions 
was the full list of individuals and a 5 point Likert-like scale. 
We used the data derived from these questions to construct the broker measures and control 
(instrumental) variables. To test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, we use the measure of constraint 
(Burt, 1992) and develop a measure of Simmelian brokerage. We first discuss the measure of 
constraint proposed by Burt (1992) and subsequently the measure for Simmelian brokerage. 
 
Constraint is a negative measure of brokerage opportunities. It reflects the degree to which 
individual i faces a lack of broker opportunities because he/she has few relationships and 
his/her contacts are mutually connected. To capture the first factor, we calculate the strength 
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of the relationship between individual i and q, relative to the aggregate strength of 
relationships in which i is involved with individuals j, that is, 
i
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were  is the valued element in the matrix Z that indicates the strength of the relation 
between i and j, and there are n  individuals in the network surrounding i. As  increases, the 
average  decreases. 
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The constraint measure is subsequently calculated in three more steps. In the first step, based 
on the relative strength of relationships, we combine the lack of brokerage due to few 
relationships with a measure of the degree to which individuals are mutually connected. The 
measure captures the relative strength of the direct and indirect relationship between i and j. 
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(2) 
As the relative strength of the direct and indirect relationship between i and j increases, the 
latter to a greater extent constrains i’s brokerage opportunities  
In the second step, Burt (1992) suggests to square expression (2), that is, 
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(3) 
which puts relatively extra weight on relationships that are both relatively strong directly as 
well as indirectly. 
The extent to which each individual i faces a lack of broker opportunities, constraint is the 
aggregate of (3) over j, 
jiq      pppc
j q
qjiqiji ,])[(
2 ≠+= ∑ ∑  (4) 
where ci is constraint. Based on (4) we derive constraint variables for all three (explanatory) 
networks, ‘know what’, ‘know how’ and ‘trust in intentions’.  
 
A second broker measure we consider is based on the Simmelian brokerage reported by 
Krackhardt (1999). However, Krackhardt (1999) defines no measure for Simmelian brokers at 
an individual level. Therefore, here we derive just such a measure that we feel is consistent 
with Krackhardt’s theory and comparable to Burt’s measure of constraint.  
A first design restriction we face is that the measure should consider valued relations, as does 
Burt’s constraint measure. We therefore specify Simmelian ties as, 
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where,   is a Boolean operator that produces 1 if both terms are larger than 0, and 0 
otherwise. Furthermore, valued Simmelian ties are specified as, 
⊗
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Of course, many other specifications are possible. For example, the addition of  
 to (6) would give a measure of the total value of the Simmelian triads i 
and j are both members. Also, different multiplicative measures would be possible. However, 
(6) gives the most simple measure that captures the most important aspect of a Simmelian 
triad. The source of direct constraint of the Simmelian tie lies in the strength of the 
relationship between j and q. The relationship between i and q adds indirect constraint to the 
relationship between i and j. Analysis with more complex measures than (6) did not improve 
our results, and are not reported. 
∑ +
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We derive from (5) and (6) the count and value of the Simmelian ties that i brokers for j. First, 
the number of Simmelian broker ties is, 
∑=
q
c
qjiqiji ssssb )(  (7) 
where,  is the complement of , meaning that if the latter is 1 the former is 0, and vice 
versa. 
c
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 Second, the value of Simmelian broker ties is 
∑=
q
c
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Hence, summing over j gives the total number and value of Simmelian broker ties in which i 
is the broker. Here, we take this sum as an indicator for the degree to which i’ occupies a 
Simmelian brokers. 
 
Instrumental and Control Variables. We measure individual effectiveness as the average 
in-tie strength of performance feedback. Therefore, we should control for average tie strength. 
Especially, as both brokerage measures are affected by tie strength, we need to control for the 
effects of average tie strength. Therefore we control for tie strength of the explanatory 
network variables. Furthermore, as an instrumental variable we use average in tie strength of 
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trust in abilities. We do not control for average in-tie strength of trust in intentions, because 
role ambiguity is a self-rated variable in contrast to individual effectiveness. 
Another set of control variables we will use are diversity measures, because broker measures 
could be interpreted as diversity measures. We control for the spurious effects that broker 
measures could induce, because of association with diversity based on formal roles. 
Especially, we control for diversity in departments, functions, and function tenure. 
We use two measures of diversity that are appropriate for nominal (department and function) 
and continuous data (function tenure) (Allison, 1978). We calculate the coefficient of variance 
for each individual, based on the set of co-workers that have been working with that 
individual for the last year (derived from the network questionnaire). Diversity in function and 
department were measured for the same sets of individuals, with a measure of entropy, 
∑
=
−=
m
k
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1
)ln( , (9) 
where  is the proportion of co-workers of i in the nominal category k.  kiP
Finally, we also use “function tenure” and “year of last education” to control for individual 
attributes suggested to affect role ambiguity. Indeed, greater working experience and 
experience in a specific function will be expected to negatively influence role ambiguity. 
Also, these indicators have been related to performance. 
 
System Specification and Tests. To evaluate our hypotheses we estimate four systems of 
equations, which follow from the models discussed above. Furthermore, we will select one 
model that best describes the data to compare empirical applicability of the different 
theoretical perspectives. Again we want to emphasize that Burtian and Krackhardtian models 
are complementary, but also competitive as they describe different causal processes of brokers 
effectiveness (direct and indirect). We control for competitive effects by specifying systems, 
which include the two equations that reflect the processes proposed in the two models. The 
systems are distinct in the broker measures they encompass in their equations. 
We consider 4 systems. The first system is the Burtian system and we use in both equations 
Burt’s (1992) constraint measure as a negative measure of brokerage opportunities. The 
second system is the Krackhardtian system. Here we use the Simmelian broker measure 
developed in the previous section. The third system we consider is the Simmelian system that 
combines Burt’s and Krackhardt’s theory. This system encompasses both the constraint in the 
first (Burtian) equation and the Simmelian broker measure in the second (Krackhardtian) 
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equation, as our theory suggests. Finally, we formulate the full system, which includes both 
constraint and Simmelian broker measures in both equations.  
In general terms the equations can be expressed as: 
iaiiiai CBIrap εβββα ++++= 321  (10) 
ibiibi CBTra µγγα +++= 21  (11) 
where, the i index refers to the individuals,  and ra  are individual effectiveness and role 
ambiguity variables, respectively.  and  are vectors of variables of brokers in 
information and trust networks, respectively. C  and C  are vectors of instrumental 
variables specific to equation 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, the Greek letters indicate the 
coefficients and the equation residuals. 
ip i
iBI iBT
ai bi
We estimate these systems with generalized method of moments (GMM) and use White’s 
adjustment for heteroskedasticity (EViews, 2002). The advantage of GMM estimation over 
GLS or maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is that it makes less restrictive distributional 
assumptions. As we estimate systems of equations, which each might have a different data 
generation process, GMM would give most efficient estimates. This is especially important, 
because our dataset contains 55 observations within one organization. 
As the Burtian, Krackhardtian and Simmelian system are non-nested, we use the full system 
as a benchmark to compare the other systems. More specifically, we use a likelihood ratio test 
to assess the significance of decrease in the determinant of the residual covariance matrix to 
see whether the full model improves on different systems. 
However, as these tests might be inconclusive to choose between systems, we also use a 
systems variant of the J-tests for direct comparison of non-nested models (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993). The rationale behind the J-test is twofold. First, if a system A describes 
the data generating process (DGP) correctly, the explanatory contribution of a competing 
system B should not be significant. And, second, if system A describes the DGP correctly its 
explanatory contribution to system B should be significant. Hence, in this test two conditions 
must be met to select one non-nested model over another. 
However, as we are considering a system with two equations, the specification of one 
equation might be appropriate, while the other specification is not appropriate. In our case, the 
Simmelian system has one equation in common with both the Burtian and Krackhardtian 
system. Hence, we need to estimate the individual and simultaneous contributions of the 
Burtian and Krackhardtian system to the Simmelian system, which thus gives three estimates. 
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This is the first part of the J-test. Subsequently, following the J-test rationale we check the 
contribution of the Simmelian system to the Burtian and Krackhardtian system. As both the 
latter systems each differ only in one equation from the Simmelian system this amounts to 
applying the basic J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the correlations of all variables used in this study. As some correlations exceed 
.75 (Tsui, et al., 1995), we have normalized our data to guard against perils of multi-
collinearity.  
The results of our system analysis are presented in table 3. The top panel of table 3 presents 
the specifications of equation 1 that describe the “Burtian” effects on individual effectiveness. 
A result consistent across all system specifications is that role ambiguity has a negative effect, 
as was predicted in hypothesis 4. This result is consistent with earlier findings on the relation 
between role ambiguity and job outcomes. 
Interestingly, the Burtian system does not support hypothesis 1 (-.810, p > .10), but does 
support hypothesis 2 (1.074, p < .05). This might be a consequence of system 
misspecification, because we use constraint instead of the Simmelian broker measures in the 
second equation. The results of the Simmelian system (the theoretically appropriate 
specification) support both hypothesis 1 and 2 (respectively, -1.068, p < .10, and 1.189, p < 
.05). A salient detail is that when we replace the Burtian measure of constraint with our 
measure for Simmelian brokers, we find strong support for hypothesis 1 (.118, p < .01), but 
also a weak significant opposite effect for hypothesis 2 (.166, p < .10). This would suggest, at 
least with regard to ‘know what’ knowledge that our Simmelian broker measure better 
captures brokerage advantages than constraint. This idea is supported by the results in the full 
model, which show significant effects for constraint in the ‘know how’ network (1.301, p < 
.05) and for the Simmelian broker measure in the ‘know what’ network (.131, p<.001). 
 The second panel of table 3 presents specifications of equation 2 that describe the 
“Krackhardtian” effects on role ambiguity. The Burtian system does not show support for 
hypothesis 3, which is not surprising as the Burtian model in essence makes no explicit 
statements about role ambiguity. The Krackhardtian model does explicitly focus on role 
ambiguity and the Krackhardtian system supports hypothesis 3 (.201, p < .001). Also, in the 
Simmelian system and the full system there is support for hypothesis 3.  
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The bottom panel of table 3 presents summary system statistics. The DRC (determinant of 
residual covariance) is the systems equivalent of the residual variance in single equation 
models. The likelihood-ratio test shows that the Burtian system explains significantly less 
system variance than the full system. However, this test is inconclusive about the relative 
performance of the Krackhardtian and Simmel systems compared to the full system. To 
further assess which of these systems of equations provides a better description of the 
processes in the Burtian and Krackhardtian model, we perform a J-test. 
*** Insert table 4 about here*** 
Table 4 presents the results of the J-test. We left out the coefficients of the systems variables 
in this table and focus on the coefficients of the dependent variable estimates. Recall that in 
the J-test we add estimates of dependent variables from one system to another system. 
Columns 2 to 4 show that the role ambiguity estimate (Burtian system) in equation 2 and 
individual effectiveness estimate (Krackhardtian system) in equation 2 and equation 1 in the 
Simmelian system respectively are not significant, neither alone, or in combination. However, 
column 5 and 6 show that when we add estimates from the Simmelian system to the 
Krackhardtian and Burtian system they become significant. This result suggests that the 
Simmelian system outperforms both the Burtian and Krackhardtian systems. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis conducted on data in a financial account management organization supports our 
theoretical claims. In account management informal role expectations and access to resources 
are important determinants of individual effectiveness. In accordance with earlier suggestions 
this study shows that resource brokering in service specification processes increases 
effectiveness. However, at least in one important process in account management (service 
delivery) resource brokering seems to decrease individual effectiveness. Furthermore, 
especially Simmelian brokers suffer from higher degrees of role ambiguity, which also 
decreases individual effectiveness. These contradictory theoretical predictions are separately 
captured in the Burtian model and the Krackhardtian model. Our analysis shows that neither 
model fully explains individual effectiveness of brokers. It is the Simmelian model that 
merges the Burtian and Krackhardtian model that shows best fit for our data. On the one hand, 
it shows that, depending on the resources (‘know what’ or ‘know how’ knowledge), brokering 
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increases individual effectiveness. On the other hand, Simmelian brokers face more 
dysfunctional role ambiguity, because they face more diverse role expectations. 
This paper makes several theoretical contributions to the existing literature. One theoretical 
contribution is that we further develop Krackhardt’s (1999) idea on Simmelian brokers. Using 
Simmel’s (1950; 1978) ideas on trust and insights of modern role and trust theory, we propose 
that trust in intentions is a necessary component of Simmelian ties. Another theoretical 
contribution is that we identify two major knowledge resources in account management, 
which are respectively good and badly accessible to brokers.  
Using these theoretical insights on the crucial relationship contents, the main contribution of 
the paper is that we present a more complete model of broker effectiveness. This model is 
rooted in Simmelian sociology and consistent with both Burtian and Krackhardtian theory. 
Especially, as we show the empirical validity of this model and its superiority over competing 
models, this adds to our contribution. 
Our dataset is unique in that we found a specific type of account management organization 
where all individuals are almost equally involved in both specification and delivery processes. 
Certainly, in other industries and organizations formal organization could separate these 
processes among different individuals. However, this will not change the implications of our 
findings. Indeed, a change in formal structure could be a consequence of our results. An 
organization might give greater autonomy to those that are required to behave more 
intrapreneurial, while it stimulates the formation of teams for those who need to get things 
done. 
Another interesting point that came forward in our analysis is that the Simmelian broker 
measure in a ‘know what’ resource network explains performance better than the Burtian 
constraint measure. This could be a statistical artifact, however we feel this point deserves 
some further attention. Recall, that constraint measures the lack of broker opportunities 
among individuals’ relationships. This also includes the lack of opportunity to broker 
Simmelian ties. In fact, constraint aggregates lack of all broker opportunities (although not in 
a linear fashion). Our results at least suggest that it might be fruitful to develop propositions 
about how the opportunity for brokering structurally different types of relationships 
contributes to different processes. A question could be: what are the effects of brokering semi-
Simmelian ties (not all ties in the triad are reciprocated) in different resource networks? 
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A limitation of our study is that we do not identify the nature of specific role expectations. 
The scope of possible relevant behavioral expectations is broad, for example, in terms of 
ethical behavior, commitment and solidarity. This is important because we know that informal 
group norms that develop in cliques may be incongruent with organizational interest 
(Friedkin, 2001). Exploring more explicitly the inconsistencies between formal and informal 
expectations could improve the development of account management organization. 
Furthermore, we limit our study to brokerage within organizations. The importance follows 
from the early qualitative works of Shapiro and Moriarty (1984b), who emphasize that “… the 
ability of the national account managers to gain respect and credibility with the customer, to 
build a relationship with the customer’s buying influences, and to gain sales will be dependent 
to a great extent upon his or her ability to make things happen in his or her own company.” 
However, in account management the boundary spanning role is at least as important. Indeed, 
Shapiro and Moriarty (1984b) continue with, “… the account manager’s ability to make 
things happen in his or her own company depends on his or her ability to build customer 
relationships and to sell.” Especially in business-to-business account management, external 
brokerage within a customer organization might become a more important influence on 
individual effectiveness. A restriction on our dataset is that it describes a business-to-
consumer account management and hence we could not assess the effects of external 
brokerage.  
A third limitation concerns the fact that our analysis is static. It could however be easily 
expanded to a dynamic assessment of the Burtian, Krackhardtian and Simmelian model. In 
our analysis there is no need to model the relation between strength of trust and Simmelian 
ties. However, the trust brokers receive is likely to be in a constant state of flux. As 
Simmelian brokers have a hard time dealing with diverse expectations they might loose trust 
of other triad members. As a trust decline reduces expectation strength it becomes easier for 
brokers to meet such less stringent expectations. This in turn will increase trust, which 
produces expectations that again will be harder to meet. Furthermore, although brokers 
receive less trust from their triad co-members, this is not necessarily so vice versa. This 
implies that it could be harder for triad members that are no Simmelian broker to meet 
expectations. In short, the study of trust balances and unbalances in a dynamic setting, offers 
plenty of opportunities for further research. 
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There are many implications of these results for account management organizations and the 
individuals these organizations employ. For example, it is important to design account 
management organizations such that they optimize the benefits of brokers. This means 
maximizing brokerage in specification processes and minimizing brokerage in delivery 
processes. As restrictions to this optimization are organization-specific—number of accounts, 
number of specialist areas, complexity of product/service, ratio of importance of specification 
and delivery processes—many different optimal designs may result. 
Also the activity of “networking” seems more consequential than one might expect. 
Connecting to different groups may bring the cost of higher role ambiguity. Making 
employees aware of these consequences and learning them to cope with these consequences 
may enhance organizational performance. Furthermore, these results may guide human 
resource officers in recruitment, development and integration processes.   
Organizations that consider introducing account management should take notice of these 
results. The costs to reduce the ineffectiveness of brokers or to optimize the use of brokers 
within an account management organization could be high. To balance these cost accounts 
should generate sufficient revenues. Indeed, whether the costs associated to the design 
conditions that this study implies for effective account management organizations can be 
covered by revenues from potential accounts, is an important decision criterion for 
introducing account management. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper shows that brokers in ‘know what’ specification networks enjoy advantages that 
enhance their individual effectiveness. However, brokers in ‘know how’ delivery networks are 
at a disadvantage and have more difficulty meeting informal role expectations. Two 
fundamental processes in account management are specification and delivery processes. The 
former requires more ‘know what’ knowledge, while the latter requires ‘know how’ 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, we show that trust in intentions is a necessary component of Simmelian role 
relationships. These Simmelian ties transmit strong role expectations to individuals. As a 
consequence, Simmelian brokers in networks of trust in intentions suffer higher degrees of 
role ambiguity than non-brokers. Consistent with earlier findings, we show that role 
ambiguity negatively affects individual effectiveness. 
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We build our argument on the models of Burt (1992) and Krackhardt (1999). Following 
Podolny and Baron (1997) we expand the basis of their arguments by diversifying relationship 
content.  
This analysis is of great importance as within account management literature emphasis has 
been put on the ‘intrapreneurial’ behavior. Network literature shows that brokers do have 
intrapreneurial advantages (Burt, 1992). We emphasize that these advantages can only be 
obtained in networks that conduit specific types of resources. In account management these 
resources are needed in specification processes. When individuals in account management 
need to provide input for delivery processes they need resources that are less well obtainable 
for brokers. Implications for organizations that use account management to serve their most 
important customers may be so diverse as if they involve organization design, human resource 
management and “networking” strategies of individuals. 
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Tabel 1: Factor Loadings Role Ambiguity  
 Itemsa Factor Loadings 
1. I feel certain about how my performances will be evaluated .20 
2. Explanations are clear about what has to be done .63 
3. I feel certain about how much authority I have .50 
4. I know that I have divided my time properly .05 
5. I know what my responsibilities are .62 
6. For my job there exist clear planned goals and objectives .49 
7. I know exactly what is expected of me .63 
  α=0.72 
a Items 1 to 7 are reverse scored. 
 
Table 2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Performance .098 -.274 -.321 .147 .261 -.301 .160 .317 .248 .160 -.231 .118 -.305 .012 .148 .742
(2) Role Ambiguity  -.130 -.161 .465 .352 -.215 .065 .252 .058 .224 -.206 .379 .217 -.363 .332 .065
(3) Constraint Know What   .744 -.371 -.292 .030 .173 -.426 -.285 -.645 .692 -.429 .120 .031 -.189 -.236
(4) Constraint Know How    -.446 -.344 .156 .251 -.398 -.339 -.575 .631 -.460 .344 .034 -.142 -.233
(5) Simmelian Broker Know What     .592 -.182 .047 .032 -.021 .376 -.409 .810 -.096 -.013 .119 .022
(6) Simmelian Broker Know How      -.172 -.036 .140 .066 .320 -.321 .410 -.110 -.115 .013 .198
(7) Out Tie Know What       -.034 -.056 -.155 .197 -.032 -.145 .125 -.080 -.212 -.230
(8) Out Tie Know How        -.232 -.094 -.331 .210 .072 -.071 .028 -.100 .064
(9) In Tie Know What         .578 .252 -.359 .097 -.106 -.100 .391 .485
(10) In Tie Know How          .102 -.141 -.023 -.198 .088 .360 .429
(11) Diversity Department           -.625 .368 .106 -.255 .206 .125
(12) Constraint Trust Intentions            -.531 .098 .182 -.099 -.242
(13) Simmelian Broker Trust Intentions             -.105 -.097 .152 .022
(14) Function Tenure              -.213 -.006 -.284
(15) Year Education Finished               -.139 -.074
(16) Diversity Function Tenure                .182
(17) Average Received Trust in Abilities     
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 Table 3: Performance-Role Ambiguity Systems• 
Equation 1: Performance Burtian System 
Krackhardtian 
System 
Simmelian 
System 
Full  
System 
Constant A .444 (.483) 
.001 
(.081) 
.282 
(.425) 
.598 
(.505) 
Role Ambiguity -.730** (.240) 
-.694** 
(.237) 
-.438* 
(.191) 
-.527* 
(.232) 
Constraint 'Know What' -.810 (.643)  
-1.068† 
(.622) 
-.745 
(.671) 
Constraint 'Know How' 1.073* (.524)  
1.189* 
(.497) 
1.301* 
(.507) 
Simmelian Broker 'Know What'  .118** (.035)  
.131*** 
(.029) 
Simmelian Broker 'Know How'  .166† (.096)  
.105 
(.106) 
Know What Out Ties -.468** (.144) 
-.355** 
(.116) 
-.365** 
(.137) 
-.377**
(.128) 
Know How Out Ties .419*** (.110) 
.366*** 
(.099) 
.361*** 
(.102) 
.350***
(.093) 
Know What In Ties .466***  (.121) 
.446*** 
(.111) 
.338** 
(.117) 
.430*** 
(.110) 
Know How In Ties .131 (.114) 
.244* 
(.118) 
.197 
(.119) 
.176 
(.106) 
Departmental Diversity .459* (.185) 
.352** 
(.102) 
.433* 
(.171) 
.390* 
(.157) 
Equation 2: Role Ambiguity      
Constant B -.091 (.811) 
.760* 
(.330) 
1.092*** 
(.294) 
1.195 
(.745) 
Constraint Trust in Intentions -.822 (.716)   
.173 
(.653) 
Simmelian Broker Trust in Intentions  .201*** (.039) 
.185*** 
(.038) 
.196*** 
(.040) 
Function Tenure .153* (.071) 
.182** 
(.056) 
.172* 
(.066) 
.171** 
(.060) 
Year Education Finished -.566** (.180) 
-.620* 
(.245) 
-.801*** 
(.227) 
-.726*** 
(.197) 
Diversity Function Tenure .205** (.073) 
.229* 
(.089) 
.235* 
(.092) 
.227** 
(.079) 
     
DRC .327 .276 .280 .275 
J-statistic .729 .691 .587 .737 
LR-test DRC 7.325† .112 .798  
Equation 1     
R-squared .170 .226 .330 .347 
Adjusted R-squared - .026 .044 .173 .143 
Equation 2     
R-squared .261 .374 .364 .364 
Adjusted R-squared .183 .308 .297 .278 
•Data are normalized, Instrumental variable: Average Trust Abilities 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
†)p<.10,*)p<.05,**)p<.01,***)p<.001 
DRC=Determinant Residual Variable 
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Table 4: J-Test for Non-Nested Models 
Equation 1:  
Individual Effectiveness 
Simmelian 
System 
Simmelian 
System 
Simmelian 
System 
Krackhardtian 
System 
Burtian 
System 
Estimate Individual Effectiveness 
Simmelian System    
.803† 
(.408)  
Estimate Individual Effectiveness 
Krackhardtian System 
.132 
(.611)  
.114 
(.616)   
      
Equation 2: Role Ambiguity       
Estimate Role Ambiguity 
Simmelian System     
1.145***
(.205) 
Estimate Role Ambiguity Burtian 
System 
-1.019 
(.940) 
-.226 
(.800)    
      
Standard errors in parenthesis 
†)p<.10,*)p<.05,**)p<.01,***)p<.001 
Null hypothesis: Competing system specification has no explanatory power. 
 
Figure 1: Broker and Simmelian Broker 
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